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THE KENTUCKY RULE OF DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF
EXECUTORY CONTRACTS TO CONVEY REALTY.
As a general proposition, the fundamental principle of the
law of damages is to compensate an injured party for loss sus-
tained, whether by breach of contract or by tort; and it must be
conceded that there is a breach of contract in any case wherein
a vendor refuses or is unable to convey a title to realty in accord-
ance with the terms of an executory agreement under circum-
stances in which the vendee is ready, willing and able to perform
his correlative obligations. However, a number of jurisdictions,
among them Kentucky, have made an exception in certain
,instances to this principle of damages when applied to actions
for breach of contracts for the sale of land, both executory, on
suit for breach of the agreement to convey, and executed, on
suit for breach of warranties of title. It is with the former that
this article deals.
This exception is commonly referred to as the "English
Rule" and, when applied, the effect is to limit recoverable dam-
ages to the amount paid on the purchase price and expenditures
by the vendee in reliance upon expected performance of the
executory contract by the vendor, or, in the absence of such pay-
ments, to nominal damages; whereas, in cases or jurisdictions in
which the exception is not applied, the measure of such damages
is the amount of payments and expenditures plus the difference
between the contract price and the market value of the land at
the time of the breach, which is usually the time when title was
to 'have been conveyed as provided in the agreement.
The basis of the exception seems to lie in a distinction
between and classification of the causes of the breaches:
I. A refusal by a vendor, holding good title, to convey;
II. Fraud on the part of the vendor in falsely representing him-
self as holding good title;
III. Total lack of title in the vendor at the time of the agree-
ments;
IV. A defect not amounting to a total lack of title in the vendor,
either unknown to him, or of such a nature that he honestly believed
that he could remove it before time for performance.
I. A refusal by a vendor, holding good title, to convey, or
a voluntary incapacitation subsequent to formation of the agree-
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ment, as by conveyance to a third party, has properly and uni-
formly been held not to justify an exception to the general rule
of compensatory damages for breach of the contract to convey.
In such case, the measure of damages is the difference between
the contract price of the land and the fair market value thereof
at the time of the breach, plus recovery of payments or expendi-
tures, with interest, made by the vendee in reliance upon the
anticipated performance of the vendor.1
In Gordon v. Wanless,2 which was a suit for damages for
breach of contract to exchange lands, the defendant having con-
veyed to another, the court stated:
"The rule is well settled that, where a vendor refuses to convey
property which he has agreed to sell, the vendee is entitled to recover
the difference, if any, between the price fixed by the contract and the
fair market price of the property at the time the contract was broken,
and In addition his reasonable costs and expenses( in an effort to com-
plete the sale."
II. Fraud on the part of the vendor in falsely represent-
ing to the vendee at the time of formation of the contract that
the vendor holds good title should be the basis of full recovery
of the difference between the contract price and market value of
the land at the time of breach, plus payments and expenditures,
with interest, and the law should not invoke an exception to the
rule of compensatory damages in favor of a fraudulent vendor.
The Kentucky Court has correctly recognized the applicability
of the general proposition aud refused to limit the general rule
of compensatory damages by the exception above stated.3
It must be recognized, however, that difficulty lies in
attempting to lay down categorically just what factors will con-
'Patrick v. Marshall (1810), 2 Bibb. (5 Ky.) 40, 4 Am. Dec. 670;
Fisher's Heirs v. Kay (1811), 2 Bibb. (5 Ky.) 434; Kaelin v. Rufenacht(1885), 6 Ky. Law Rep. 748 (Abst. Dec.); Caumisar v. Conley (1901),
22 Ky. Law Rep. 1237, 60 S. W. 375; Whitworth v. Pool (1906), 29 Ky.
Law Rep. 1104, 96 S. W. 880.
2 (1929) 231 Ky. 498, at 501; 21 S. W. (2nd) 815.
'Gerault v. Anderson (1812), 2 Bibb. (5 Ky.) 543; Rutledge v.
Lawrence (1818), 1 A. K. Marsh. (8 Ky.) 396. In Goff v. Hawks (1831),
5 J. J. Marsh (28 Ky.) 341, the court stated: "If, however, the
covenantor has been guilty of fraud, a different rule may govern the
case. Then, he would be responsible for the increased value of the
land, at the time his covenant should have been performed." This
language was quoted with approval in Potts v. Moran's Exec'rs (1930),
236 Ky. 28, 32 S. W. (2nd) 534; Wilson v. Hendrix (1891), 13 Ky. Law
Rep. 687 (Abst. Dec.); Salyer v. Blessing (1913), 151 Ky. 459, 152 S. W.
275; Elsey v. Lamkin (1914), 156 Ky. 836, 162 S. W. 106; Bunch v.
Bertram (1927), 219 Ky. 848, 294 S. W. 805.
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stitute fraud in varying circumstances. Diversity exists in
various jurisdictions in holding that certain factors constitute
fraud as a matter of law; and, of course, juries will differ in
their reactions to evidenciary showings of fraud as a matter of
fact. The Kentucky Court is very liberal in favor of the vendor
in refusing to treat proof of the existence of an outstanding
defect of title, known to the -vendor and unknown to the vendee,
as fraudulent per se, and apparently limits application of the
fraud rule to cases in -which fraud is found on a factual issue.4
III. Total lack of title in the vendor at the time of the
formation of the agreement, -with continued inability to perform
at time for execution of the contract, may or may not amount to
a defense. Under those jurisdictions5 refusing to follow the
"English rule," of course lack of title is no defense. Under
those jurisdictions applying the "English rule," total lack of
title, if the vendor knew or should have known thereof, is usually
taken as the equivalent of fraud, and therefore no excuse for
nonperformance. 6
The case of Jenkins v. Hamilton,7 (which was overruled on
the angle of damages,8 ) was a suit for specific performance with
a claim for damages for deficiency; the opinion contains this
very pertinent language:
"Jenkins positively covenanted to covey to them within thirty
days the fee simple title to the 158-acre tract free from all liens and
encumbrances or claims and he must be held bound by such under-
taking, even though Hamilton and Elliott at the time knew of all the
facts, and were of the opinion that he could not carry out that con-
tract. It would not be a safe rule to permit one to evade the effect of
his failure to carry out his contract by saying that the other party
knew at the time it was entered into that it could not be carried out.
To hold so would be to point out a plain avenue of escape In many
cases from one's solemn obligations.
" . . In other words men must be bound by their contracts,
and if they make contracts which it turns out they could not perform,
they must from the very nature of things be liable therefor."'
I E. g., compare cases cited post, note 89, where several states have
held that the existence of an Inchoate right of dower, undisclosed to
the vendee, forms the basis for recovery of compensatory damages,
apparently as being equivalent to fraud, while the Kentucky court has
held contra in Potts v. Moran's Exec'r (1930), 236 Ky. 28, 32 S. W.
(2nd) 534.
5See cases cited post, notes 106-124 Inclusive.
,Stephenson v. Harrison (1823), 3 Litt. (13 Ky.) 171.
7 (1913) 153 Ky. 163, at 168, 154 S. W. 937.
3 Crenshaw v. Williams (1921), 191 Ky. 559, 231 S. W. 45, 48
A L. R. 5.
'As to damages, the court stated: "The court properly instructed
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Later referring to this case, the Court stated10 that in the
Jenkins case the defendant "did not pretend to have any title
or interest whatever in the premises he contracted to convey."
But in Potts v. Moran's Exec'rs," is found this dictum:
"We have never held that, if the vendor at the time of entering
into the contract knows that he has not title, or that it Is necessary
to procure the consent or conveyance of another whom he is without
power to compel, this of itself in case of breach is such bad faith as
will entitle the vendee to the benefit of his bargain... .
IV. A defect, not amounting to a total lack of title in the
vendor, either unknown to him, or of such a nature that he
honestly believed that he could remove it before time for per-
formance is the situation in which the exception is most com-
monly applied, and the case of Potts v. Moran's Exec'rsl .* is
the most recent case extending this doctrine in Kentucky. In
that case the suit was for breach of contract to deliver title to
lands situated in Florida, with a difference between contract and
market values of $36,295.00, the defect in title being an inchoate
right of dower which the vendor's wife (not a party to the agree-
ment), refused to release; it did not appear in evidence that the
vendor had acted in bad faith. The trial court directed a
verdict of one dollar, and the ruling was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals in a decision in which the Court, after reviewing a
number of English and American authorities, followed the
"English rule."
The Court in Crenshaw v. Williams12 had entered a similar
judgment where the defect consisted of a life estate in the vendor
under circumstances in which the vendor had honestly supposed
that he held a fee simple title.
While this exception to the general rule of damages is
clearly recognized, the reasons for the rule, while admittedly
based upon a line of English decisions, are conflicting and
obscure both in Kentucky and elsewhere, and a further con-
sideration of the law in Kentucky first requires an examination
of the English cases.
the jury that the measure of damages was the difference between the
contract price and the fair and reasonable market value of the land
on the day it was to have been conveyed under the contract, if the
value was in excess of the contract price. . .
"Crenshaw v. Williams, supra, note 8.
(1930) 236 Ky. 28, 32 S. W. (2nd) 534.
* Supra, note 11.
Is Supra, note 8.
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The earliest case in which the doctrine was enunciated was
Flureaz v. Thornhill,13 which was a suit for breach of the
executory contract, the vendor being without fraud. De Grey,
C. J., stated:
'"Upon a contract for a purchase, if the title proves bad, and the
vendor is (without fraud) incapable of making a good one, I do not
think that the purchaser can be entitled to any damages for the
fancied goodness of the bargain, which he supposes he has lost."
And Blackstone, J., added:
"These contracts are merely upon condition, frequently expressed
but always implied, that the vendor has a good title. If he has not,
the return of the deposit with interest and costs is all that can be ex-
pected."
No further reason was given, and the decision was without cita-
tion of authority upon this proposition.
Almost immediately dissatisfaction was felt toward this
rule. Between 1776 and 1826 two unreported cases' 4 refused to
follow the decision. The next case, ffopkins v. Grazebroos,15
was decided in 1826. There the defendant had contracted with
a third party for the purchase of an estate, but, without waiting
for a conveyance, had put up the estate for sale in lots by auction
and had contracted with the plaintiff to make good title by a
certain date, which he was unable to do, as defendant's vendor
never made conveyance to him. The Court allowed full
recovery, upon the ground that where a vendor holds out an
estate as bis own, the purchaser may presume that he had a
satisfactory title.' 6
This limitation was thereafter considered as well established
1 (1776) 96 Eng. Rep. 635, 2 W. Bl. 1078.
J4 jones v. Dyke, Sugden: Vend. & Pur. (14 ed.) append. 5; the
decision was by the court of Common Pleas in bane. Bratt v. Elis,
Sugden: Vend. & Pur. (14 ed.) append. 6; the decision was at nisi
prius.
" 109 Eng. Rep. 364, 6 Barn. & C. 31, 9 D. & I. 26, 13 E. C. L. 100,
5 L. J. K. B. (0. S.) 65
"Abbott, J., stated: "Upon the present occasion I will only say
that if it is advanced as a general proposition, that where a vendor
cannot make a good title the purchaser shall recover nothing more
than nominal damages, I am by no means prepared to assent to It."
Bayley, J., added: "The case of Flureau v. Thornhill is very different
from this, for here the vendor had nothing but an equitable title. Now
where a vendor holds out an estate as his own, the purchaser may,
presume that he has had a satisfactory title, and if he holds out as
his own, that which is not so, I think he may very fairly be compelled
to pay the loss which the purchaser sustains by not haviuig that for
which he contracted."
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and was frequently invoked to avoid the rule of Flureau v.
Thornhill'7 up until 1874 when the limitation was overturned in
the House of Lords.' 8
There was thus established the general rule of Flurea v.
Thornhill" and the exception engrafted thereon by Hopkins v.
Grazebrook,20 and from 1826 to 1874 the problem seemed largely
to be whether the Courts, which felt antagonistic to the former
rule, could justifiably bring an instant case within the limitation
of the latter. The reasoning was at times ingenious; and the
cases were about equally divided.2 1
ST upra, note 13.11Bain v. Fothergill (1874), L. R. 7 H. L. 158, L. R. 7 Eng. & Ir.
App. 158, 43 L. J. Ex. 243, 31 L. T. 387, 23 W. R. 261"
SEupra, note 13.
Supra, note 15.
nWalker v. Moore (1829), 109 Eng. Rep. 504, 10 B. & C. 416,
8 L. J. (0. S.) K. B. 159, followed Flureau v. Thornhill. Plaintiff con-
tracted with defendant in good faith, and delivered an abstract show-
ing good title; but before plaintiff examined it with the original deeds,
the latter contracted to resell at a profit. Later examination showed
an outstanding right to an undivided 1/20. Held, that plaintiff could
not recover loss of profits. Park, J.: "A jury ought not, in case of a
vendor in possession, to give any other damages in consequence of a
defect than those which were allowed in Flureau v. Thornhil. . .
In the absence of any express stipulation about it, the parties must
be considered as content that the damages, in the event of the title
proving defective, shall be measured in the ordinary way, and that
excludes the claim of damages on account of the supposed goodness of
the bargain."
Robinson v. Harmon (1848), 1 Exch. 850, 154 Eng. Repr. 363, 18
L. J. (Ex.) 202, discussed but did not apply Flureau v. Thornhill.
Worthington v. Worthington (1849), 137 Eng. Rep. 459, 8 C. B.
134, 18 L. J. C. P. 350, followed Flureau v. Thornhill. Plaintiff entered
into possession under an agreement with defendant, whereby plaintiff
was to hold as tenant for 'two years with liberty to make at his own
expense alterations and additions to the premises, the plaintiff to have
an option to purchase at any time within two years, it being provided
in the agreement that defendant was possessed of the premises for
his own life and the life of a third party and the survivor of them.
Defendant did not have the interest stated. Held, that plaintiff was
entitled to recover only the value of the proposed lease and not the
value of the improvements he had made upon the lands. Coltman, J.:
"Every one who purchases land knows that difficulties may exist as
to the making a title, which are not anticipated at the time of entering
into the contract. But, if the purchaser thinks proper to enter into
possession and to incur expense in alterations, before the title is ascer-
tained, he does so at his own risk."
Pounsett v. Fuller (1856), 139 Eng. Rep. 1235, 17 C. B. 660, 25
L. J. C. P. 145, 4 W. R. 323, followed Flureau v. Thornhill. Defendant
had agreed to sell to plaintiff the shooting over the manor of a third
party. It was afterwards discovered that defendant had a mere equit-
able title and, the third party refusing to confirm it, plaintiff sued
defendant for breach of the contract. Held, plaintiff was entitled to
recover nominal damages and expenses incurred in examination of the
title. Williams, J., in referring to Flureau v. Thornhil, stated: "Thus
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far the vendor was held liable to nominal damages only for his failure
to make out a good title, unless he was guilty of fraud in the transac-
tion. It is difficult to state the reason for the distinction. The position
of a vendor of real estate is somewhat hard. His title is submitted
to the scrutiny of a skillful conveyancer well practiced in the dis-
covery of latent defects. One would think it quite punishment enough
for him to be made to pay the expense of the detection of the fraud,
without further infliction in the shape of damages for the fancied good-
ness of the bargain." (However, the learned judge here seems to
overlook the fact that the principle of damages is not punishment to
the defendant, but compensation to the plaintiff.)
Sikes v. Wild (1861), 121 Eng. Rep. 832, 1 B. & S. 587, 101 E. C. L.
587, 7 Jur. (N. S.) 1280: aff'd (1863), 122 Eng. Rep. 517, 4 B. & S. 421,
32 L. J. (Q. B.) 375, 8 L. T. R. (N. S.) 642, 11 W. R. 954, was this
case: Real estate has been devised to the defendant in trust for sale,
and plaintiff agreed to buy it. The defendant was aware that he could
not make a title free from encumbrance, as by a marriage settlement
the land was vested in trustees to secure an annuity to the widow of
the devisor, but defendant had obtained from her a parol promise that,
in the event of a sale, she would transfer her security to another prop-
erty. Later she refused and the sale to plaintiff failed. Blackburn, J.,
held that the rule of Flureau v. Thornhill applied, and that loss of the
bargain was not recoverable, but Cockburn, C. J., expressed strong
dissent: "That immunity is in itself an anomaly. It probably had its
origin in the difficulty in which, in the complicated and highly arti-
ficial state of our law relating to real property, an owner of real estate
having contracted to sell is too frequently placed from not being
able to make out a title such as a purchaser would be bound or willing
to take. The hardship which would be imposed on a bona fide vendor
if, upon some flaw appearing in his title, he were held liable in all the
consequences which would attach upon a breach of contract relating
to personalty, and the difficulty which might be thrown in the way of
bringing real property into the market if the full liability attached in
such a case, have probably, by an understanding and usage among
those engaged in the transfers of estates, led to this exception to the
general law. But I can see no reason, in the absence of authority, for
extending the exception to parties who, knowing that they have not
any present estate to convey, take upon themselves to sell in the specu-
lative belief that they will be able to procure an interest and title
before they are called upon to execute the conveyance. There is an
obvious difference between an owner who knows that he alone is en-
titled to an estate and has a right to sell it, although he may fail to
make out a sufficient title, and a person who, not having the estate,
takes upon him to sell on the expectation of acquiring the estate in
time and making out a title."
In Locke v. Furze (1866), L R. 1 C. P. 441, 1 H. & R. 379, 35 L. J.
C. P. 141, 15 L. T. 161, 14 W. R. 403, a testator professed to grant to
plaintiff a lease for 21 years with a covenant for quiet enjoyment. It
turned out that the lessor had no title to grant for 21 years, having
only an estate for life. He died and his successor avoided the lease and
made a new bargain with the lessee for a shorter lease upon higher
terms. Held, plaintiff could recover against the estate for the loss on
difference in market values, distinguishing Flureau v. Thornhil.
Flureau v. Thornhil was adheed to in Gray v. Fowler (1873),
L. R. 8 Ex. 249, 42 L. J. Ex. 161, 29 L. T. 297, 21 W. R. 916 and dis-
tinguished in WaUl v. City o1 London Real Property Co. (1874), L. R.
9 Q. B. 249, 43 L. 3. Q. B. 75, 30 L. T. 53. See also Engel 'v. Fitch
(1868), post, note 22.
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In Engel v. Fitch 2 2 this situation was involved. The defen-
dants, who were mortgagees of a house, sold it by auction to the
plaintiff, possession to be given on completion of the purchase.
The plaintiff resold at an advance. On investigation title was
found satisfactory, but the plaintiff required possession at
once, and the mortgagor was still in possession, refusing to
vacate; the defendants were in a good position to oust him by
ejectment, but they refused to complete the sale on the ground
of expenses. Plaintiff sued for compensatory damages. The
Court held that as the breach arose, not from inability of the
defendants to make good title, but, from their refusal to take the
necessary steps to give plaintiff possession according to the con-
tract, plaintiff could also recover damages for loss of his bargain,
and the measure of damages was the profit which it was shown
he could have made on resale. In discussing Flureau v. Thorn-
hill,2 3 Cockburn, C. J., stated :24
"It certainly would have been more satisfactory if, in a case laying
down so important and at the same time exceptional a rule, the judges
had given the reasons of their decision as a guide in future cases.
We are left in doubt whether the decision proceeded on an established
practice of conveyancers and solicitors, or, as has been suggested, on
the ground that in the complicated state of the law of real property
the owner of an estate is often unable to make out such a title as a
purchaser will be bound to take, and the parties therefore, are not
only placed on fair terms if, on the purchaser rejecting the title, the
liability of the seller shall be limited to the repayment of the deposit
and the expenses of investigating the title.
S..But the limit of the exception is to be found in the rea-
son on which it is based; the reason ceasing, the rule should also
cease. It can properly have no application where the non-performance
of the contract arises not from a difficulty as to title, but from the
fact of the party who engages to sell not having first secured for him-
self the property in the thing of which he takes on himself to dispose.
In such a case, there seems no sound reason why the consequences
which arise on a breach of contract in the sale of goods should not
equally attach. Far from seeing any grounds, either in law or reason,
for extending the rule, there appear to us good grounds to the con-
trary in our view, notwithstanding what is said by Erle, C. J., in
Sikes v. 'Wild, the rule is an anomalous one-that is to say, it is a de-
parture from general principles, and inconsistent with ordinary rules
of law, based upon and applicable to a special and exceptional state
of things alone. There is, therefore no reason, in a legal point, for
extending it; while, on the other hand, there seems good reason for
not encouraging men to affect to sell property, the power to dispose
of which they have not secured, and thereby entail inconvenience and
possible loss on the purchasers without, at least, bringing to the knowl-
edge of the latter the real position in which they stand."
- (1868) L. R. 3 Q. B. Cas. 314; aft'd, L. R. 4 Q. B. Cas. 659, 38
L. J. Q. B. 304
-Supra, note 13.
L. R. 3, Q. B. Cas. at pp. 326 and 331.
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The Kentucky Court apparently treats this case as having
been overruled,2 5 but this seems erroneous. 26
In 1870 Bain v. Fothergill was decided in the Exchequer. 27
The defendants had contracted to assign to plaintiff their inter-
est in an iron ore royalty; at the time of entering into the con-
tract the defendants knew that consent of their lessors to the
assignment to plaintiff would be necessary, but no mention of
the necessity of such consent was made to the plaintiff. The
defendants later fulfilled the conditions on which the lessors
had originally been willing to consent to the assignment, but
the lessors had meanwhile withdrawn their consent and, in
spite of all efforts, defendants were unsuccessful. Plaintiff
claimed for loss of bargain, thus bringing the case squarely
within the rule of Hopkins v. Grazebrook.28 . But the Exchequer
held plaintiff was not entitled to these damages and the deci-
sion was affirmed in the House of Lords.29 The effect of the
decision in Bain v. Fothergil was to overrule the limitation
which Hopkins v. Grazebrook30 had engrafted upon the rule of
Flureau v. Thornhill,3 1 but the reasoning was inclined toward
looseness.32 'Rain v. FothergilP33 was followed in Gas ight &
Coke Co. v. Towse,3 4 but the latter case is hardly authoritative
.' Potts v. Moran's Bxec'rs, supra, note 11; the language used is:
"with the result that the cases of Engel v. Fitch . . . were disap-
proved."
2See Lindley, M. R., in Singleton v. Day (1899), 2 Ch. 320, at
p. 329; and Mew's Digest of English Case Law, Vol. 20, p. 1301.
L. R. 6 Exch. 59.
1 Supra, note 15.
(1874) L. R. 7 H. L. 158, L. R. 7 Eng. & Ir. App. 158, 43 L. J.
Ex. 243, 31 L. T. 387, 23 W. R. 261.
10 Supra, note 15.
,Supra, note 13.
"Assuming that the vendor acts bona fide, the difficulty must
be equally known to the vendee as to the vendor." (Query, Why?)
To enter into a contract for the purchase of land immediately
to resell it, before the title is examined, is unusual and exceptional.
It seems, therefore, more reasonable to treat the mere contract for the
conveyance of land, not as based upon an implied warranty that the
vendor has power to convey, but as involving the condition that the
vendor has good title, and that if, on examination of the abstract, this
turns out not to be so, the vendee cannot ask to be put in as good a
position as if a conveyance with the usual covenants had been exe-
cuted, but can only recover the expenses to which he has been put."
(Italics ours.) But what is the effect of this distinction in a jurisdic-
tion where, as in Kentucky, the damages for breach of the executed
agreement are measured by the purchase price?
S upra, notes 27 and 29.
" (1887) 35 Ch. Div. 519, at p. 542, 56 L. J. Ch. 889, 56 L. T. 602.
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in that respect since it appeared that both parties knew of the
existence of the defect.
At this point it would appear that Flureau v. ThornhilZ35
had been vindicated, all exceptions laid to rest and the law clear
for £ill future times. This tranquility was short-lived for Day
v. Singleton36 came up for decision in 1899. In the latter case,
the defendant, who held a leasehold which he had no right to
assign without license from his lessor, contracted to sell the
interest to the plaintiff but, the defect becoming apparent, the
defendant was unable to secure consent of the lessor to the
assignment. The Court found that the vendor had failed to
do his best to procure the license and gave full compensatory
damages.37 It suggests itself that the reason for this distinc-
tion lies less in a differentiation between "doing one's best,"
(Bain v. Fothergill),38 and "not doing one's best," (Day v.
Singleton),39 and more in a deep-rooted objection to the un-
natural results of the rule of Flureau v. Thorntill,40 which it
seems almost impossible for mere decisions to overcome.
Day v. Singleton41 took unique advantage of a subtle dis-
tinction introduced by Lord Hatherley in Bain v. Fothergifl:42
"The vendor in that case (Engel v. Fitch) was bound by his con-
tract, as every vendor is bound by his contract, to do all that he could
to complete the conveyance. Whenever it is a matter of conveyancing,
and not a matter of title, it is the duty of the vendor to de everything
that he is enabled to do by force of his own interest, and also by force
of the interest of others whom he can compel to concur in the convey-
ance." (Italics ours.)
Was the defect then, in Bain v. Fothergil43 a matter of
title, and that of Day v. Singleton44 a matter of conveyancing?
Where can the line be drawn; and what rules shall govern the
differentiation? Perhaps, as to England, the answer is laid
down (almost with a smile?) in Daniell v. Vassa 1. 45 There a
uSupra, note 13.
N (1899) 2 Ch. 320, 68 L. J. Ch. 593, 81 L. T. 306, 48 W. R. 18.
"Braybrooks v. Whaley (1919), 1 I. B. 435, 88 L. J. K. B. 577;
120 L. T. 281, 63 S. J. 673, followed Day v. Singleton and distinguished
Bain v. Fothergill.
Supra, notes 27 and 29.
Supra, note 36.
10 Supra, note 13.41Supra, note 36.
2 Supra, note 29.
8 Supra, notes 27 and 29.
"Supra, note 36.
(1917) 2 Ch. 405, 87 L. J. Ch. 69, 117 L. T. 472, 61 S. J. 646, 33
T. L. R. 503.
K. L J.-9
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testator had agreed to sell property which, with other property,
was subject to one mortgage. After his death the title was
accepted by the purchasers; but the mortgagees refused to re-
lease the property sold from their mortgage, and, the estate
being insolvnt, the executors of the vendor had not enough funds
of the estate for redemption of the mortgage. Held, that the
liability to the purchaser was not limited to the costs of investi-
gating the title, but that plaintiff was entitled to general dam-
ages for loss of the bargain. In such case the absence of willful
fraud and bad faith is immaterial. The Court stated :4
"For as pointed out by Lindley, M. R., in Day v. Singleton, it
(Flureau v. Thornhill) is an anomalous rule based upon and justified
by difficulties in showing a good title to real property in this country.
Now there is no special difficulty in obtaining a release of real estate
that is in mortgage. All that is required in general, and all that was
requisite here, was to pay off the mortgage or a sufficient part of it to
satisfy the mortgagees; and but for the lack of pecuniary means the
testator and his estate were in a position to force the concurrence of
the mortgagees.41 And this being so. a further remark of Lindley, M. R.,
in the same passage becomes apposite, namely, that the anomalous rule
in question 'ought not to extend to cases in which the reasons on which
it is based do not apply.' "" (Italics ours.)
As these cases have indicated, one reason for the rule lay
in the fact that in England a contract for the sale of real estate
was closed almost directly. But in the United States, long-term
options are given, as well as long-term executory, contracts, so
that while in England there was practically no fluctuation in
the value of realty during the short time necessary for the
closing of the contract, there may be considerable change in
the value of the property under American practices. 49
It must be noted that it is proper, even in case of fraud
by the vendor, to allow the innocent vendee to rescind and to
recover payments made, expenses incurred and cost of improve-
ments placed upon the property. This should be considered in
the nature of an election of remedies.50 Consequently a line
10 (1917) 2 Ch., at p. 409.
SAnd in these modern times where "the husband's dominion over
the wife is not what it once was, and the wife of today has asserted
and established her independence . . . exercising her own judg-
ment" (Potts v. Moran's Exec'rs), would not the wife release her dower
interest if the husband paid her sufficient consideration therefor?
41 Compare Morgan v. Russell (1909), 1 K. B. 357, 78 L. J. K. B. 187,
100 L. T. 118, 25 T. L. R. 120, applying Bain v. Pothergill.
49 Ontario Asphalt Block Co. v. Montreuil (1916), 52 Can. Sup. Ct.
541, 27 D. L. R. 514, Ann. Cas. 1917 B. 852.
0eaver v. Hall (1897), 50 Nebr. 878, 70 N. W. 373; aff'd on re-
hearing, 52 Nebr. 316, 72 N. W. 217.
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of Kentucky authorities in which the plaintiff framed his com-
plaint upon the theory of rescission or cancellation, with claim
for recovery of expenses and payments made, should not be
considered as authoritative upon the right to recover damages
for loss of bargain in either fraudulent or non-fraudulent
breaches by the vendor.51
In addition to these cases which, by the nature of the
pleadings, are not authoritative upon the issue in question,
there have been a number of cases in which the Kentucky court
(most frequently by dicta) has indicated favor toward the
rule that, in the absence of fraud, the vendee cannot recover
the full measure of damages. The reasons given by the Kntucky
Court for following this rule fall roughly under four headings:
I. The case following by analogy the rule of damages in case of
breach of executed contracts.
II. The cases following the lead of the English decisions.
III. The cases based on the condition of real estate titles.
IV. The cases following the rule of stare decisis.
I. A large number of those cases which are cited by the
Court as authorities for the rule were decided on the question
of damages for breach of warranty in the executed contract,5 2
"Bullitt v. Eastern Kentucky Land Co. (1896), 99 Ky. 324, 36
S. W. 16, 18 Ky. Law Rep. 230, rescission.
S lemwell v. Carper's Adm'rs (1905), 27 Ky. Law Rep. 997, 87
S. W. 771, encumbrance-cancellation and refund.
Gayle v. Troutman (1907), 31 Ky. Law Rep. 718, 103 S. W. 342, re-
fusal to convey-rescission and refund.
Elliott v. Walker (1911), 145 Ky. 71, 140 S. W. 51, rescission and
lien for price paid.
Moreland v. Henry (1914), 156 Ky. 712, 161 S. W. 1105, deficit in
acreage.
Mann v. Campbefl (1923), 198 Ky. 812, 250 S. W. 110, encum-
brance-cancellation and refund.
nAUen v. Anderson (1811), 2 Bibb (5 Ky.) 415.
Cox's Heirs v. Strode (1811), 2 Bibb (5 Ky.) 273, 5 Am. Dec. 603.
Booker's Adm'r v. Bell's Ex'rs (1813), 3 Bibb (6 Ky.) 173, 6 Am.
Dec. 641.
Kelly's Heirs v. Bradford (1314), 3 Bibb (6 Ky.) 31,7, 6 Am. Dec.
656.
Rankin v. Maxwell's Heirs (1820), 2 A. K. Marsh. (9 Ky.) 488,
12 Am. Dec. 431, bill for specific performance, it appearing that defect
in title applied to only part of the land; the case is not authoritative
since there was no proof of actual value of the land at tflie of breach
of the agreement to convey.
Triplett v. Gill (1832), 7 J. J. Marsh. (30 Ky.) 438.
Combs v. Tarleton's Adm'rs (1834), 2 Dana (32 Ky.) 464.
Hunt v. Orwig (1856), 17 B. Mon. (56 Ky.) 73, 66 Am. Dec. 144.
Robertson v. Lemon (1867), 2 Bush (65 Ky.) 301.
Sullivan v. Hill (1908), 33 Ky. Law Rep. 962, 112 S. W. 564.
Helton v. Asher (1909), 135 Ky. 751, 123 S. W. 285.
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which is determined by the purchase price and reasonable ex-
penditures, and are only analagous due to the declarations of
the Court that "with respect to the measure of damages, there
was no substantial difference between a breach of warranty of
title, and the breach of a covenant to convey where the vendor
acted in good faith.' 53
It will be noticed, however, that the English cases cited
ante (upon which the Kentucky rule is based), were cases
where the situation did not involve breach, of warranty and in
which the question was: "Shall full compensatory damages be
awarded on breach of the executory contract?" and not: "What
damages shall be awarded for breach of covenant of warranty?"
Clearly the English Courts have recognized that the rules are
not necessarily analagous as to the measure -of damages. It is
submitted that these cases also5 4 are not authoritative on the
measure of damages.
II. There are really very few cases in which the Ken-
tucky Court has expressly recognized the "English rule."
Allen v. Anderson5 5 cites Flureait v. Thornhill,56 but as pointed
out ante57 that case involved breach of warranty, nor does the
decision contain any discussion of the principle involved. Hern-
don v. Venable5s was a square decision but cites no authority
other than Combs v. Tarleton59 and Triplett v. GillO which also
were cases on warranties; nor does the Court discuss the princi-
ples of the rule in question. Wilson v. Hendrix61 appears only
as an unreported decision. Slusher v. Moore 2 contains a dic-
tum, the case involving a suit for broker's commission. The deci-
sion in Jenkins v. Hamilton6 3 was clearly contra to the 'English
rule", and must impliedly have overruled Herndon v. Yen-
able,64 but, as pointed out, the Jenkins case was expressly over-
ruled as to the rule of damages.6 5 The only cases which appear,
51E. g., Potts v. Moran's Rxec'rs, supra, note 11.
14 Supra, note 52.
51 Supra, note 52.
5 Supra, note 13.
5, Supra, note 52.
5 (1838) 7 Dana (37 Ky.) 371.Supra, note 52.
Supra, note 52.
Supra, note 3.
(1924) 202 Ky. 13, 258 S. W. 946.
Supra, note 7.
Supra, note 58.
6 Supra, note 8.
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after diligent search, to discuss the origin and authority of
the rule as based upon Flureau v. Thornhfl166 are Crenshaw v.
WilliamsU7 in 1921, and Potts v. Moran's Exec'rs.6s in 1930.
III. Apparently the only case in Kentucky indicating a
possible basis for the rule upon the condition of real estate titles
is that of Crenshaw v. Williams,69 in which the Court stated:
"The English Courts put the distinction upon the ground of the
intricate involvement of titles to real estate growing out of the vari-
ously worded deeds, wills and other muniments of title, so that a
vendor might innocently believe that he could convey a good title when
a learned attorney or a court might determine otherwise. Another
reason suggesting itself to us is that real property is the only char-
acter of property absolutely essential to human existence," and that
it is the policy of the law for it to remain in the hands of home-
buirders and homemaintainers," and not to encourage speculative or
chance bargaining in it, but to adjust the rights of the parties con-
cerning the transfer, in the absence of fraud or bad faith, by placing
them in statu quo, which, in the absence of a contrary showing will
be presumed to have been in their contemplation."' 2
Even though it be granted that the doctrine was not en-
tirely illogical when applied to the actual conditions surround-
ing the execution of these contracts when the "exceptional and
anomalous rule" was first enunciated in England due to the
fact that the executory status of the contract was intended to
be, and usually was, of short duration, it nevertheless appears
that in practically all American jurisdictions the character and
purpose of executory contracts have so changed as to make this
rule of damages inapplicable, especially since the executory
character of the agreement frequently extends over a period
of years, during which time the vendee has made substantial
payments upon the principal, and substantial improvements
upon the property, with the result that the value of the property
" upra, note 13.
Supra, note 8.
Supra, note 11; and neither of these cases note the interesting
development in the English law since Bain v. Fothergill in 1876.
S upra, note 8.
"This "reason" seems to have the uniqueness of novelty.
But if the homebuilders and homemaintainers purchase on long-
term contracts and, defects appearing at the close thereof, whereby
their interest is rendered worthless are compelled to be content with
the return of their payments with interest (even assuming that such
a judgment is collectable), it would seem that they would have neither
that particular home nor another home which they might have secured
with the same money before land values advanced, and therefore the
policy of the law is defeated.
1- While this is an orthodox argument of the English Courts, query,
if this really Is the Intent of the purchaser.
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is greatly increased, exceeding the price paid plus cost of im-
provements with interest. Also modern practices of conveyanc-
ing, and statutes regulating recordation have tended, if not
been designed, to increase and facilitate rapid trading in titles.
There is no longer a good reason why one who undertakes to
sell a particular interest may not be required to abide by the
terms of his contracts especially since, if there is any doubt
in his mind, the vendor may protect himself by the insertion
of express provisions against contingencies or for liquidated
damages.7 3
IV. Crenshaw v. Williams74 also introduced a new reason
for the rule which seems not to have been clearly stated thereto-
fore by the Kentucky Court. It is the rule of stare decisis:
"It has been wisely said, in substance, that it is not so material
as to what the law is as that it be certain. It is, of course, the Intent
of the law and the desire of the courts that abstract justice should pre-
vail in every case, and that judicial declarations should harmonize
with logic and reason as inspirations for them; but in the multiplicity
of complicated facts found in almost every case, which control its final
destiny, such a coveted result cannot always be obtained by fallible
humanity. There can be, however, in the same jurisidction, approxi-
mate certainty as to the law applicable to the same state of facts, and
courts of last resort should strive for the summation of that end.
Thus guided, and remembering the stare decisis doctrine, we are con-
strained to hold that the doctrine of the cases hereinbefore referred to(except the Jenkins case) is the one which we should adopt in this
case."
As has been pointed out, it is the opinion of the writer that
the decisions in Kentucky have by no means been as authorita-
tive upon this proposition as this quotation indicates. Nor has
the proposition been without some digression and dissent in
Kentucky,75 particularly Jenkins v. Hamilton, quoted ante.70
See also Grant v. McArthur's Exec'r7 7 in which vendors had
contracted to deliver a fee title by a certain date and then dis-
covered that they held only a life estate; expenditures were then
made to clear the title and plaintiff sought to charge these
"
3Hartzell v. Crumb (1886), 90 Mo. 629, 3 S. W. 59.
74 Supra, note 8.
75Aflison v. Cocke's Exec'rs (1901), 112 Ky. 212, 65 S. W. 342,
66 S. W. 392, 23 Ky. Law Rep. 1599.
Whitworth v. Pool (1906), 29 Ky. Law Rep. 1104, 96 S. W. 880.
"' Supra, note 7.
- (1913) 155 Ky. 356, 155 S. W. 732.
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expenditures upon a partnership settlement between the ven-
dors. This the Court allowed.78
Nor have the possible reasons for adhering to the rule of
Flureau v. ThornhkiJi passed without vigorous criticism from
some of those jurisdictions which follow the contrary rule. The
consideration of the contract is never the rule of estimating
the damages for breach of an express agreement.80 And why
should good faith of the vendor diminish the actual damages
which the vendee has sustained by reason of the breach of the
contract?8 1 The basing of compensatory damages solely upon
the existence of fraud (actual or implied from the circum-
stances) practically amounts to allowing full recovery in an
action ex contractu only upon the existence of a cause of action
ex delicto. And while Professor Ames pointed out that the
action of special assumpsit developed from the tort action of
deceit,8 2 liability for breach of contract no longer depends on
a tortious misfeasance or nonfeasance. Even the English cases
have declared the rule anomalous,8 3 and that the rule should not
be extended beyond the situations for which it was designed.8 4
Motives, good faith or fraud in the mind of the vendor are
difficult things to prove and the rule encourages loose contractual
dealings; the "English rule" furnishes an incentive to perjury
and falsification, since the vendor is strongly tempted to avoid
his agreement where there has been a rise in the value of the
property. ,  The English rule "is not easily applied in all
cases, and the books are burdened with discussions and restric-
tions and qualifications which, in different jurisdictions are
annexed to it."s6
"Stating: "On the other hand they (the vendors), had not exe-
cuted a deed to Messrs. Flynn and Simmons, but were under obligation
to do so and to convey a good title by a certain time. If therefore they
failed to do so by the time stipulated in the contract, they were liable
in damages for such failure."
" Supra, note 13.
We7ls v. Abernathy (1828), 5 Conn. 222.
n Tracy v. Gunn (1883), 29 Kan. 508.
IL "History of Assumpsit," 2 Harv. LSaw Rev. 1; Ames: Lectures on
Legal History, 129; Selected Essays on Anglo American Legal History,
Vol. 3, p. 259; Selected Readings on the Law of Contracts, 33.
8 E. g., Sikes v. Wild, supra, note 21; Engel v. Fitch, supra, note 22;
Day v. -Singleton, supra, note 36; Daniell v. Vassall, supra, note 45.
"E. g., Sikes v. Wild, supra, note 21; Engel v. Fitch, supra, note 22;
Day v. Singleton, supra, note 36; Daniell v. Vassall, supra, note 45.
8Doherty v. Dolan (1876), 65 Me. 87, 20 Am. Rep. 677.
"Idem., 20 Am. Rep., at p. 680.
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It is an interesting coincidence that the rule has not been
extended to the executory contract for the sale of chattels8 7 and,
as the Kentucky Court has stated.8 8 "If it should be asked
why there should be a different rule governing the measure-
ment of damages for failure to comply with a contract relating
to real estate, than the one of personalty, we might find it dif-
ficult to give a satisfactory answer."
It is also notable that while Kentucky holds that, where
the defect consists of a refusal of a spouse to release dower,
plaintiff cannot recover for loss of the bargain, some other jur-
isdictions have held opposite and allowed recovery of full dam-
ages under those circumstances.8 9
The "English rule" has been applied also in California, 0
Indiana,91 Iowa,92 Louisiana,9 3 laryland,94 Mlichigan,
95 Mlon-
tana,96 New Jersey,97 Pennsylvania, 98 South Dakota, 99 Texas,100
Virginia,' 01 Washington,10 2 West Virginia,1
0 3 Wisconsin 10 4
and Canada.'0 5
"TKitchen v. Wilcox (1900), 21 Ky. Law Rep. 1823, 56 S. W. 514.
'Crenshaw v. Williams, supra, note 8.
1Greenberg v. Ray (1926), 214 Ala. 481, 108 So. 385.
Key v. Alexander (1926), 91 Fla. 975, 108 So. 883.
Puterbaugh v. Puterbaugh (1893), 7 Ind. App. 280, 33 N. E. 808,
34 N. E. 611.
McAdam v. Leak (1922), 111 Kan. 704, 208 Pac. 569.
Grosso v. Sporer (1924), 123 Mis. Rep. 796, 206 N. Y. S. 227.
McCarty v. Lingham (1924), 111 Oh. St. 551, 146 N. E. 64.
Greer v. Doriot (1923), 137 Va. 589, 120 S. E. 291.
Stone v. Kaufman (1921), 88 W. Va. 588, 107 S. E. 295.
9Yates v. James (1891), 89 Cal. 474, 26 Pac. 1073.
"Blackwell v. Board of Justices (1828), 2 Blackf. 143; but cf.
Puterbaugh v. Puterbaugh, supra, note 89.
9White v. Harvey (1916), 175 Ia. 213, 157 N. W. 152.
9"Baton Rouge Realty Co. v. Bailey (1925), 157 La. 838, 103 So.
184.
"Horner v. Beasley (1907), 105 Md. 193, 65 Atl. 820.
"Bartlett v. Smith (1906), 146 Mich. 188, 117 Am. Rep. 625, 109
N. W. 260.
"Ross v. Saylor (1909), 39 Mont. 559, 104 Pac. 864.
" Gerbert v. Sons of Abraham (1896), 59 N. J. L. 160, 69 L. R. A.
764, 59 Am. St. Rep. 578, 35 Atl. 1121.
Orr v. Greiner (1916), 254 Pa. 308, 98 Atl. 951.
9Dal v. Fischer (1906), 20 S. D. 426, 107 N. W. 534.
"'0Kelly v. Simon (1924), 262 S. W. 202.
101 Greer v. Doriot, supra, note 89.
10Crawford v. Smith (1923), 127 Wash. 77, 219 Pac. 855.
' 3Mooring v. Warnock, (1924), 95 W. Va. 539, 121 S. E. 732; but
cf. Stone v. Kaufman, supra, note 89.
""McFarlane v. Dixon (1922), 176 Wis. 652, 187 N. W. 671, 48
A. L. R. 1.
0 Ontario Asphalt Block Co. v. Montreuil, supra, note 49.
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But it has been denied application in Alabama,10 6 Arkan-
sas,107 Florida, 08 Georgia, 09 Illinois,"s0  Kansas,"' Maine, 112
Alassachusetts,"S3 MNIinnesota,"14 Missouri,"15 Nebraska,"i6 New
Hampshire,"17 New York,"s North Carolina,"s9 North Dakota, 20
Ohio,121 Utah,' 22 Wyoming' 23' and the United States Supreme
Court.' 24
CONCLUSION.
It is submitted in conclusion that while a number of the
early Kentucky cases indicated adherence to that which we now
denominate the "English rule." of damages, that those remarks
were dicta, due to the fact that the question therein was not
squarely presented and the actual decisions are upon other pro-
positions; that those decisions do not reveal any investigation
of the English law at the time those cases were decided. That
the situations in which the rule was first evolved, and adherence
placed thereon, in England were strictly cases of breach of the
executory contract, while the rule in Kentucky is based, as far
as precedent is concerned, upon the analogy of the rule of dam-
ages for breach of the executed contract upon the assumption
that the rule of damages is and should be the same in both types
of case. 125 It is also submitted that Jenkins v. Hamilton'26 was
'll Greenberg v. Ray, supra, note 89.
l'McGregor v. Bcehols (1927), 153 Ark. 128, 239 S. W. 736.1
" Key v. Alexander, supra, note 89.
'"Mitchell v. Owen (1924), 31 Ga. App. 649, 121 S. E. 699, rev. 159
Ga. 690, 127 S. E. 122; (1925) 33 Ga. App. 665. 128 S. E. 12.
"'Dady v. Condit (1904), 209 I1. 488, 70 N. E. 1088.
2u McAdam, v. Leek, supra, note 89.
u2 Doherty v. Dolan, supra, note 85.
"'Boyden v. Hill (1908), 198 mass. 477, 85 N. E. 413.
: Vallentyne v. Immigration Land Co. (1905), 95 Minn. 195, 103
N. W. 1028, 5 Ann. Cas. 212.
"'Kirkpatrick v. Downing (1874), 58 Mo. 32, 17 Am. Rep. 678.
O Beck v. Staats (1908), 80 Nebr. 482, 114 N. W. 633, 16 L. R. A.
N. S. 768.
Chartier v. Marshall (1876), 56 N. H. 478.
"' Grosso v. Sporer, supra, note 89.
2"Howefl v. Pate (1921), 181 N. C. 117, 106 S. E. 454.
'"Merritt v. Adams County Land Co. (1915), 29 N. D. 496, 151
N. W. 11.
"ULMcCarty v. Lingham, supra, note 89.
I"Dunshee v. Goeghegan (1891), 7 Utah 113, 25 Pac. 731.
2"Francis v. Brown (1915), 22 Wyo. 528, 145 Pac. 750.
I'Hopkins v. Lee (1821), 6 Wheat. 109, 5 L. Ed. 218.
"'Is it possible that criticism might also be made of the rule of
damages for breach of warranty?2"Supra, note 7.
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authoritative in Kentucky upon the law in question, and that
the Court, in Crenshaw v. Williams,127 was in error in believing
that Jenkins v. Hamilton was an isolated case in conflict with a
settled general rule. It is the opinion of the writer that the
decisions of Crenshaw v. Williams and Potts v. Moran's
Exec'rs128 are out of harmony with the later development of the
law in England, particularly in respect to the rules of Day v.
Singleton12 and DanielZ v. Vassall-30 which indicate a definite
trend away from the limitations of Bain v. Fothergill's' upon
.which the Kentucky Court has placed reliance ;132 and that the
objections to the "English rule" seem so weighty as a matter of
logic, and so desirable as a matter of public policy for those ends
which the law desires to protect, as to commend further con-
sideration by the Court. The American jurisdictions adhering
to the "English rule" and those disagreeing with it are so closely
balanced that it is impossible to affirm that Kentucky is actually
within the majority rule.
It is respectfully submitted that upon a reconsideration of
this problem in the next presented case that the Court of Appeals
would be within the principles of stare decisis in overruling
Crenshaw v. Williams 33 and Potts v. Moran's Exec'rs,134 (since
courts do occasionally overrule an erroneously decided case),
and in returning to the correct rule of Jenkins v. Hamilton,135
taking cognizance of the fact, under the present development of
our systems of conveyancing and recordation, that land titles
are not in a chaotic state. It is believed that by definitely
readopting this rule the court would achieve those results of
tending toward uniformity of the law in this jurisdiction, of
having abstract justice prevail, of harmonizing judicial declara-
tions with logic and reason and as inspirations for them, of pro-
tecting homebuilders and homemaintainers, of discouraging
speculative and chance bargaining in realty, of discouraging per-
jury and of fairly adjusting the rights of both parties to the
121 Supra, note 8.
,0 upra, notes 8 and 11 respectively.
2 Supra, note 36.
"' Supra, note 45.
2 Supra, notes 27 and 29.
32 E. g., Potts v. Moran's Bxec'rs, supra, note 11.
-113 Spra, note 8.
'31 Supra, note 11.
"I Supra, note 7.
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transfer,-which it has in Crenshaw v. Williams'136 declared to
be the aim of the Kentucky Court of Appeals.
WENDELL CARNAHAN.
Professor of Law,
University of Louisville,
Louisville, Kentucky.
'-"Supra, note 8.
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